Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential
Competition Doctrine
Although the last great tide of mergers appears to have receded,"
the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice continue to challenge conglomerate mergers2 that
involve a firm of substantial size.3 Most mergers involving a "dominant"
firm-an acquiring firm with annual sales of more than $200 million
or an acquired firm among the largest in a concentrated market-are
4
still subject to close scrutiny.
Because doctrines developed to combat earlier waves of horizontal
and vertical mergers proved inadequate to prevent conglomerate acquisitions, 5 the doctrine of potential competition was developed to meet
1 The number of acquisitions involving a consideration of more than $700,000 declined
to 1,237 in 1971 from 1,829 in 1968. 7 MERGERS & AcquisrrloNs 38 (1972).
2 The terms "merger" and "acquisition" are used interchangeably throughout this
comment.
8 See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 886 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Inter73,619 (N.D. 111. 1971); United States v.
national Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); United States v. CrockerAnglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (three-judge court); United States v.
General Dynamic Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); St. Joe Minerals, Dkt. 8992, 3
20,047 (FTC 1972) (complaint); Illinois Cent. Indus., 3 TRADE REG.
TRADE REG. REP.
20,028 (FTC 1972) (complaint); Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
REP.
19,338 (FTC 1970) (complaint).
4 According to the guidelines issued by the Antitrust Division, the Department of
Justice "will ordinarily challenge any merger between one of the most likely entrants
into the market and: (i) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market; (ii)
one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the two largest firms
amount to approximately 50% or more; (iii) one of the four largest firms in a market
in which the shares of the eight largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more,
provided that the merging firm's share of the market amounts to approximately 10%o
4510, at 6887-88 (1968). Although the guidelines do not
or more." I TRADE REG. REP.
make reference to the size of the acquiring firm, Assistant Attorney General McLaren
said that the Division would ordinarily challenge the acquisition of a leading firm in a
concentrated industry by one of the nation's 200 largest firms. Speech before the House
50,101 (1969); cf.
Ways and Means Committee, Mar. 12, 1969, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
Statement by Assistant Attorney General McLaren to the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust
50,114 (1970). The FTC's statements
and Monopoly, Feb. 18, 1970, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
of "enforcement policies," promulgated for four industries, rely heavily on the absolute
4515 (1967-68).
size of the firms involved. 1 TRADE REG. REP.
5 The conglomerate merger does not "foreclose" commerce, for example, since the
acquiring and acquired firms do not trade in each other's markets. Nor does the mere
substitution of one owner for another, characteristic of conglomerate acquisitions, increase
concentration in the market of the acquired firm.
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the challenge.6 As initially formulated, the doctrine prohibited both
potential market entrants and firms that had once decided to enter a
market by internal expansion from entering by acquiring a firm dominant in a market; such an acquisition, it was posited, would end the
possibility that the acquiring firm would be an additional competitor
in the market. 7
When confronted with this theory, acquiring firms regularly argued
that they had not been potential entrants into the market except by
acquisition because, as the acquisition itself demonstrated, they had
conclusively decided" not to enter by internal expansion. Indeed, even
when this argument was not made, the government found it difficult
to establish that the firm was a potential entrant by internal expansion. 9
In order to avoid the problem of proof inherent in the original
theory of potential competition, the FTC developed the toehold acqui-sition corollary: once conglomerate acquisition of a dominant firm
demonstrated the acquiring firm's willingness to enter the market by
acquisition, ° its failure to acquire and expand a small firm (to make
6 For a summary of some of the early cases, see Markham, Merger Policy under the
New Section 7: A Six Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. REv. 489, 519 (1957); cf. FTC v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), aff'g 58 FTC 1203 (1966); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651

(1964).
7 See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967)

(three-judge court).
9 Both "objective" and "subjective" evidence was used. "Objective" evidence includes
data about the market, the firm's past expansion, and statements made about the firm
by third parties. "Subjective" proof consists of internal reports and memoranda created
by the firm itself. Lately the FTC has been willing to rely upon proof almost wholly
objective, see The Papercraft Corp., Dkt. 8779, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,725 (FTC 1971),
and many commentators have argued that objective proof should suffice under the Clayton
Act, see, e.g., REPORT OF THE P ESIDENTAL TASK FoRcE ON PRODucrvnTy AND COMPETITION,
5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,108,-at 51,136 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STiGLER TAsK Foce];
Brodley, Oligopoly Power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory
to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 332, 856-59 (1967); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1384 (1965). The FTC has not
yet premised a finding that a firm has violated the law solely upon objective proof.
Sterling Drug Inc., Dkt. 8797, 3 TADE ILEG. REP.
19,961, at 21,981 n.27 (FTC 1972).
Objective proof was said to be insufficient by itself in United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970, 972 (D.R.I. 1971) (dictum), prob. juris. noted, 405 U.S. 952 (1972).
The need for either form of proof was apparently rejected in Kennecott Copper Corp.,
Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE Re.
REP.
19,619, at 21,666-67 (FTC 1971), when the FTC for
the first time applied the incipiency theory to a conglomerate merger. The need for
proof is dramatically weakened when only an incipient decrease in potential competition must be shown.
10 Kennecott Copper Corp., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. Ru'.
19,619, at 21,699 (FTC
1971).
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a "toehold acquisition") lessened potential competition in the market."
Acquisition and expansion was thus considered the functional equivalent of entry by internal expansion: both created increased, actual
12
competition.
Although the FTC developed the toehold theory in response to a
problem of proof, it has begun to assume a more central place in the
antitrust arsenal. The courts have held the theory authorized by the
Clayton Act,' 3 and, in at least one recent complaint, the Antitrust
Division cast the failure to make a toehold acquisition as an integral
part of the substantive offense of monopolization. 14
This comment first examines the content and rationale of the toehold theory. The discussion suggests that because the theory was
developed to meet the perceived problem of proof that potential competition had been diminished, its exact boundaries and most of its
implications have never been delineated. In particular, analysis indicates that the theory's economic justification does not provide support
for the use to which it has been put. The comment then examines the
propriety of the theory as a tool for enforcing the Clayton Act and
concludes that, even if the theory does make economic sense, it is not
warranted by section 7. Finally, the comment suggests that the major
significance of the theory will be to enable defendants to claim that
acquisitions of a sort heretofore held unlawful are in fact legitimate
toehold acquisitions.
I. THE TOEHOLD ACQUSITION THEORY
A. The Background: The Potential Competition Doctrine
Conglomerate acquisitions have been exceedingly difficult to challenge under the Clayton Act. Only in recent years have the courts
accepted the theory that such acquisitions constitute sufficiently serious
decreases in potential competition 5 to be cognizable under the Act. 16
11 See, e.g., The Bendix Corp., 3

19,288 (FTC 1970).
TRADE REG. Rm,.
12 A different justification for a similar theory was advanced in the report of TIE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ANTITRusr PoLICY, 115 CONG. Rxc. 13890 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as the NEAL TAsK FORcE]. The Task Force recommended the promulgation of
relatively clear rules concerning conglomerate mergers in order to channel merger activity
into more procompetitive forms and in order to provide some degree of certainty in the
market for small firms.
13 United States v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., Civil No. C72-493 (N.D. Ohio, May 15, 1972).
14 See text and notes at notes 45-56 infra.
15 Conglomerate acquisitions have also been criticized as creating an opportunity for
"reciprocity" and the possibility of "entrenchment," but neither theory has substantial
economic support. Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust Policy: An Introduction,
in CONGLOMERATE MARGERS AND AcQuiSmoNs: OPINION AND ANALYsIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
529 (special ed. 1970).
16 The first major case acknowledging the theory was United States v. El Paso Natural
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The existence of potential competition may have a present effect on
prices in a concentrated market in which the participants are able to
limit quantity and affect price. 17 If the participants recognize that
prices above a certain level will attract new entrants, who will expand
the supply and drive prices down, the presence of potential entrants
limits the prices that the current participants charge.
A conglomerate acquisition may also diminish the potential for
competition, quite independently of the perceptions of the current
participants, if the acquiring firm is one that would otherwise have
entered the market by internal expansion. While entry by acquisition
is a mere change in ownership, which leaves the market shares of the
various participants unchanged, de novo entry would have expanded
supply-at least in the short run. In addition, since de novo entry
would have increased the number of participants in the market, it
would have made collusive action more difficult to establish and
maintain.
Most analysis of potential competition has been devoted to elucidating the conditions under which the eliminition of an imminent de
novo entrant has an actual effect on competition. It is clear that if
there are few barriers to entry, the elimination of one potential entrant
will not have any effect on prices in the market, since there would still
be entrants if prices were increased.18 On the other hand, if there are
significant barriers to entry, there will be few likely entrants. It is difficult, however, to determine whether a particular firm is a potential
entrant-a determination that is crucial if the potential competition
doctrine is to be applied to the particular firm that made the acquisition. 19 Even if it could be established that the potential for future entry
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), but its use there was quite peculiar since the merger was
clearly horizontal.
17 See text and notes at notes 65-77 infra.
20,121 (FTC 1972);
18 See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., Dkt. 8814, 3 TRAD. R G. REP.
Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants,
15 Aierrrausr BuLL. 489, 493-95 (1970); Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate
Mergers, 13 ANrrrausr BuLL. 1361 (1968); Hammond, Conglomerate Mergers and the
Antitrust Laws, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 646 (1969); Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, THE REcoRD 669, 675 (1967).
19 There is a certain tension inherent in the doctrine here. Only high barriers to entry
will activate the doctrine, FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571-74 (1967),
but if barriers to entry are high, any particular firm is less likely to be a meaningful
potential entrant. The standard of proof of a firm's ability to enter must therefore be
quite high. Proving that barriers are not insuperable for one firm, however, entails
proving that other similarly situated firms could have entered, which in turn demonstrates that the actual entrant does not have the unique attributes that would make the
potential competition doctrine appropriate. Justice Douglas apparently did not see this
problem in Proctor & Gamble; he stressed the ease with which the company could have
entered. Id. at 580.
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had a significant impact on the market, it would still be necessary to
prove both that the firm entering by acquisition had sufficient access
to capital to have made internal entry feasible and that the firm would
have entered internally had it not entered by acquisition.
In practice, attempts to demonstrate the firm's access to capital have
led to unfortunate results. Because it is difficult to analyze an individual firm's capacity to raise capital for entry, a "deep pocket" shorthand was developed.20 A firm that had achieved a certain size in assets
or sales was assumed to have been capable of entering internally; for
an acquiring firm lacking a deep pocket, the possibility of internal expansion was discounted. Concentration on absolute size probably identified most firms with the ability to enter de novo,21 but there was a
substantial problem of overprediction-many firms have deep pockets.
Courts and agencies that concentrated on proving that the acquiring
firm had the ability to enter de novo were also proving, therefore, that
many similar firms had the same ability.2 2 If many other firms could have
entered equally well, the elimination of one of them could make little
difference.
Thus, it became necessary to prove not only that the acquiring firm
could have entered the market, but also that it was especially likely to
have done so. 23 Proof of both factors was of necessity subsumed under
proof that entry was "imminent," a burden almost impossible to discharge. Acquiring firms were, in almost every instance, able to demonstrate that they had rejected the possibility of internal expansion. Moreover, even when management could not show that de novo entry had
been rejected, the government was unable to show with any certainty
how likely entry by internal expansion would have been had the option
to enter by merger not been available. 4 The government tried to
lighten its burden by relying on "objective" proof that a firm would
have entered de novo. It pointed to similarities between the markets
in which the acquiring and acquired firms operated, patterns of previous expansion, the potential for profitable entry, and many other
20 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,619, at 21,667
(FTC 1971); cf. FTC enforcement policies, especially that for the grocery products manufacturing industry, 1 TRADE REG. REP.
4530 (1969).
21 Firms that could have raised the necessary capital to enter through borrowing or
new stock issues were overlooked, while firms that were already overcommitted and were
(or should have been) in the process of retrenching their positions were included.
22 See note 19 supra.
23 For a general review of this problem and the response of the FTC and courts, see
Berger & Peterson, supra note 18.
24 See, e.g., The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE RE. REP.
18,898 (FTC 1969) (preliminary
decision).
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factors. 25 The FTC, however, has not yet dispensed entirely with requirement of some "subjective" proof,26 and some courts have stated
that objective proof alone is not sufficient under Clayton Act standards. 27 In addition, the government would have to establish not only
that the particular firm met the criteria, but also that few others did,
28
in order to prove that the elimination of one of them was significant.
As long as subjective proof is required, a firm can minimize the likelihood of governmental success by creating corporate documents showing rejection of internal expansion as a realistic alternative. 29
B.

The Toehold Acquisition Theory

The most expedient escape from these problems was to claim that
the firm had committed some act that by itself proved ability and
willingness to enter the market. The FTC thought it clear that acquisition of a small firm, and subsequent expansion of that firm, resembled
internal expansion in most important respects. It followed that proof
of ability and willingness to expand internally was unimportant if the
acquiring firm could have made a toehold acquisition." And since the
firm had acquired a company dominant in its market, it could be inferred that the firm had both the ability to acquire a smaller company
and a willingness to acquire at least some company in the market. By
means of this inferential chain, the FTC essentially dispensed with
the need for subjective proof of willingness and ability to enter the
market de novo; entry by acquisition of a large firm proved and ad25 The list provided by the Supreme Court in one case alone was prodigious. See
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 177 (1964).
26 See Sterling Drug Inc., Dkt. 8797, 3 TRADE REG. RE'.
19,961, at 21,981 n.27 (FTC
1972). The unprofitability of a small acquisition is apparently no bar to use of the theory.
The Stanley Works, Dkt. 8760, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,646, at 21,694 (FTC 1971).
27 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 832 F. Supp. 970, 972 (D.R.I. 1971), prob.
juris. noted, 405 U.S. 952 (1972).
28 Firms meeting the criteria in one industry might meet them in several; it is
obvious, however, that not all markets could be entered simultaneously. This overprediction of entry raises the clear possibility that acts will be forbidden even though
they have no effect whatever on competition, and in spite of the fact that there must
be some probability of actual, anticompetitive effect to make out a violation of the
Clayton Act. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
29 Cf. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970)
(successful defense to charge of reciprocity among parent and subsidiaries).
80 See Kennecott Copper Corp., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,619, at 21,669 (FTC
1971):
[W]e believe the examiner erred in his insistence that a finding of illegality depends
on Kennecott being a potential entrant by internal expansion. The form of entry
is dearly not a determinative factor. Respondent admits that it was a potential
entrant by acquisition. While it does not concede that it would have entered by
way of a small acquisition, the toehold principle nevertheless applies. With 68
producers in the industry in 1967, there obviously were smaller firms than Peabody
which could have been considered as viable acquisition candidates.
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mitted ability and willingness to enter by acquisition of a small firm,
entry that would have been akin to entering by internal expansion.
The FTC has thus developed a doctrine that compares different
methods of entering the market. If a firm selects a means of entry that
results in less competition than some alternative means, the entry is
deemed to decrease potential competition. The FTC first set forth the
theory in dicta in Beatrice Foods Co.:
The competitive effects are more difficult to predict when a very
small factor in the market is acquired by a substantial potential
competitor. The merger may increase competition in the market
by injecting a substantial firm, one capable of challenging the
dominant firms in the market, in place of a firm too small to be a
significant competitive factor . . . . The competitive effects are
likely to be most serious when the merger is between one of the
dominant firms in a concentrated market and a substantial potential competitor. In such a case ... one dominant firm has simply
been replaced by another and substantial potential competition
is eliminated.3 1
The theory was first applied in The Bendix Corp.8 2 Bendix had
acquired Fram, the dominant manufacturer of automotive filters sold
as replacement parts; Bendix itself had divisions supplying other automotive replacement parts. The hearing examiner was convinced, on
the basis of the evidence, that Bendix would have entered the market
only through acquisition. Since Bendix could not be classified as a
potential competitor under then-current doctrines, he dismissed the
FTC's complaint. The Commission reversed the decision, and ordered
Bendix to divest itself of Fram, because adverse effects on competition
might result from the elimination of a firm that could have entered
either by internal expansion "or by a toehold acquisition."38
The toehold theory applied in the Bendix case was quite rudimentary. The FTC simply concluded that anyone who acquired a dominant
firm, but who might have entered by acquiring a smaller firm, had
decreased potential competition. This was not a satisfactory rationale
because it failed to deal with the problem of overprediction. The
potential for overprediction was decreased when the theory was next
applied, in Kennecott Copper Corp.,84 since the FTC emphasized that
Kennecott had determined to acquire at least one company in the
31 [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TADE REG. REP.
17,244, at 22,332 (FTC 1965).
82 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,288 (FTC 1970), rev'g 3 TRADE 1EG. REP.
18,896 (FTC
1969).
33 Id. at 21,445.
34 Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. REP.

19,619 (FTC 1970).
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(coal) market. As in Bendix, the hearing examiner had dismissed the
complaint for lack of proof that the respondent was a potential de novo
entrant into the market. The Commission again found that the decision could not turn on that point, since Kennecott, "with its huge
financial resources.., could have expanded the operations of a small
company to attain.., sales"3 5 sufficient to make a formerly small firm
into a major market force.
The third FTC case applying the toehold theory was also decided
without proof that the firm was in fact a potential entrant. In The
Stanley Works,38 Stanley had acquired Amerock, the leading domestic
producer of cabinet hardware. Although it had apparently decided to
enter the market, Stanley contended, and the hearing examiner agreed,
that it had rejected both internal expansion and smaller acquisitions
as unprofitable. The FTC, however, held that the evidence that the
smaller acquisitions had been rejected was irrelevant.
Since the purpose of requiring a toehold acquisition is to increase
competition and prevent prices from being maintained at an artificial
level, the fact that the toehold acquisition would be less profitableor even unprofitable-cannot be accepted as a defense to a charge of
decreasing potential competition. 37 It is inevitable that the toehold
entry will be less profitable than acquisition of a dominant firm. Acquisition of a dominant firm will allow the acquiring firm to participate
in high profits generated by a restriction of production; if the acquired
dominant firm is expanded, short-term profits will fall, but the concentration in the market, and hence the potential for long-term profits,
will increase. The toehold entry, however, produces no such potential
for profit. The expansion of a small firm may be costly and even unprofitable in the short run; the quantity of goods produced will be
larger and prices will fall; the concentration in the industry will decrease. The toehold acquisition is preferred in order to produce lower
prices and a decrease in concentration. The consequential lower profitability cannot, therefore, be interposed as a defense. 88
35 Id. at 21,670.

36 Dkt. 8760, 3 TRADE
(FTC 1970).
37

REG.

REP.

19,646 (FTC 1971), aff'g 3 TRADE

REG. REP.

19,007

Once unprofitability has been rejected as a defense, great care must be exercised

to prevent unrealistic expansion of the number of potential competitors by acquisition.
The existence of barriers to entry and unique potential competitors are still necessary
before an entry by acquisition can be anticompetitive. See text and notes at notes
57-69 infra.
38 If a small acquisition would be unprofitable in the long run, no firm will intentionally
enter via toehold acquisition. This, however, does not mean that the firm should be
allowed to enter by acquiring a dominant participant. The firm might exercise a restraining influence by remaining on the edge of the market, ready to enter should market
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The response of the courts to this theory has been sparse and inconsistent. the Bendix decision was reversed because of a violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act;3 9 by inventing the theory at the last
moment the FTC was held to have deprived Bendix of proper notice
of the charges against 'it. The Second Circuit recast Stanley40 as a hori41
zontal- merger case in- order to avoid reversal on the same ground.
The FTC was upheld on appeal in Kennecott,42 - but the court merely;
ratffied the result without discussing the theory.
The toehold theory has' arisen in several proceedings brought by the;
44
Department of Justice. 43 In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.
a national brewery had entered the New England market by acquiring
the largest local brewery. The district court refused to find that the
acquisition reduced potential competition, rejecting the government's
eleventh-hour claim- that Falstaff could have acquired a smaller producer because, according to the court, the Falstaff management had
"concluded that none of said alternatives would have effected -a reasonable 'probability of a profitable entry."45 The, court thus rejected
the standard objective proof tendered by the government and relied
instead on indicia of management intent and profitability. If, however,
the standard of what is best for the firm becomes the test by which
toehold entries are to be judged, one of the primary purposes of the
antitrust laws-to prevent firms from taking- actions profitable to.
themselves but costly to the public-will be thwarted. In addition, even'
when the toehold entry-would be profitable, the firm could establish:
an effective defense by having top- management reject it as inferior
to some other course.-_A result similar to that in Falstaff was reached by a slightly different
route in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,46 in which the Antitrust Division had sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting.Atconditions change and internal entry or toehold, acquisition become profitable-whether
because of a change in demand or costs or an attempt by the current participants to
restrict supply artificially.
39- Rendix Cori v. FTC, -450-F.2d-54, 1971 Trade- Cas:" 73,724 (6th Cir. 1971).
74,207 (2d Cir. 1972).
40 The Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 1972 Trade Cas.
41 'Although the FTC rested its decision squarely on the toehold 'theory, the court
found itself unable to support the toehold theory because of the Administrative Procedure Act violation, and'proceeded to find against Stanley on a horizontal'theory that,
similarly, had not been litigated before the Commission.
42 Kennecott Copper, Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 79 n.8, 1972 Trade Cas. i 74,157 (10th
Cir. 1972).
43 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see United States v. Parker-Hannifin
Corp., Civil No. C72-493 (N.D. Ohio, May 15, 1972).
'44 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 405 U.S. 952 (1972).
45 1d. at 972.
46 -297 F. Supp. 1061" (S.D.N.Y. '1969), aff'd 401 U.S. 986 (1971).-

1972]

Toehold Acquisitions

lantic's acquisition of Sinclair. Sinclair was a major, although by no
means dominant, participant in geographical markets in which Atlantic
conducted no operations whatever. 47 The government contended that
Atlantic should have entered those markets by internal expansion or
by' smaller acquisitions if it wanted to enter them at all. The court
rejected the contention summarily, finding that the government had
failed to demonstrate that there were any smaller firms available or
that, if there were, Atlantic would seriously have considered acquiring
them.48 Since the government was unable to point to alternative acquisitions, it could not demonstrate that acquisition of the smaller firm
would have had any significantly different effect on the market. The
government's burden was increased by the fact that Sinclair did not
occupy a dominant position. The court correctly suspected that very
little competitive benefit could be achieved by forcing Atlantic to
acquire a slightly smaller firm.4 The court's decision is a first step,
therefore, toward a more precise statement of the theory: the acquired
firm must have some minimum amount of market power before the
theory can make sense.
The remaining Justice Department case in which the theory appeared is United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. 50 Wilson, the
largest sporting goods firm in the country, proposed to acquire the
manufacturer of approximately one-third of all gymnastic equipment
made in the United States. The second largest competitor had 12 percent of the market, and no other firm had as much as 10 percent Thus,
the dominance of the acquired firm and the probable availability of
smaller firms-factors absent in the Atlantic case-were demonstrated
in Wilson, and the court enjoined the merger. It found that "virtually
anything Wilson could do would be more pro-competitive than the path
47 Sinclair and Atlantic Richfield were direct. competitors in other sections of the

country,
48 It is difficult to determine whether this decision reflects hostility toward the toehold,
theory or merely the government's failure to meet the rigorous burden of proof required,
for a preliminary injunction. The United States did not, for example, offer a list of
alternative and likely acquisitions, as the FTC has done in each of its toehold theory
cases. There also seems to be an implied requirement in the decision that the government prove that Atlantic was willing to make a smaller acquisition. If this requirement
could be administered so as to disregard paper disclaimers of intent to acquire, it could
serve to prevent the universe of "potential competitors" from expanding indefinitely
through serial inferences.
49 The court might also have noted that the government did not attempt to show that
Atlantic had any unique attributes as a potential competitor.
S0 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968). This was also a request for preliminary injunctive
relief, but the court made little reference to the higher standard of proof that had to be
met.
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it has chosen."5 1 The court mentioned both making a toehold entry
and remaining a bystander to the market as acceptable alternatives.
The Wilson court appears to have accepted the toehold theory in
virtually the same form as it is used by the FTC: a large firm's acquisition of a dominant firm in a concentrated market violates the Clayton
Act because the acquiring firm could have entered the market in a
more procompetitive way by making a toehold acquisition.
C.

Advantages of the Toehold Theory

The toehold theory has achieved its major victory by avoiding many
of the evidentiary problems5 2 that had plagued the FTC in the prosecution of potential competition cases. 53 It obviates the need to demonstrate that the acquiring firm would or could have entered by internal
expansion. But the theory has other advantages that should not be overlooked. Although its operation is not absolutely clear, the theory does
make it easier for large concerns to predict that certain of their contemplated acquisitions will not be challenged. Firms that come within
the emergent definition of a "toehold" may be acquired without fear
that the transaction will later be reversed. Increased certainty will
reduce transaction costs in consummating mergers and improve the
market for small firms, raising the rewards for entrepreneurship
accordingly. 4
More importantly, the theory channels merger activity into more procompetitive forms.5 5 Firms desiring to enter a market are more likely
to make a procompetitive entry resembling internal expansion than to
acquire a dominant firm and leave the market structure unchanged.
This channeling of merger activity may in the long run lead to
Id. at 563.
see The Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 501-02 n.8, 1972 Trade Cas.
74,207 (2d Cir. 1972) (dictum): "The Commission did not point to any evidence
indicating that Stanley exercised a 'disciplining effect' on the market, nor did it illustrate
how Stanley's acquisition of Amerock would contribute to raising barriers to entry ..
The dissent would have required not only the objective proof to which the majority
referred, but also proof that the company had "irrevocably abandoned" alternative
51

52 But

avenues of entry.
53 See generally Turner, supra note 9; 39 FoRaDHiA L. REv. 515 (1971); 24 VAD.

L. REv.

121 (1970). The toehold theory has been uncritically accepted by enforcement officials.
See Jones & Heiden, Conglomerates: The Need for Rational Policy Making, in CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND

ACQISTIONS: OPINION AND ANALYsIs,

44

ST. JOHN'S

L. Rxv. 245, 255-57

(special ed. 1970); Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, lth Annual
Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University, Oct. 4, 1972, 5 TRADE REG. RaP.
50,149, at 55,253.
54 STIGLER TASK FORCE, supra note 9; cf. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:
AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 127-28 (1959); Turner, supra note 9, at 1316-18.
55 See note 12 supra.
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decentralization of certain markets and a consequent increase in
competition.5 6
II.

ECONOMIC AsPecrs

The toehold theory was developed totally without reference to the
economic precepts underlying the antitrust laws. The theory will serve
little purpose, however, unless its strictures are directed against economically meaningful targets. When the law begins to proscribe efficient or harmless forms of organization, it is imperative to reassess the
law rather than to ignore the economics. Since the toehold theory
depends upon the validity of the potential competition doctrine, it is
important to understand the exact conditions under which entry into
the market can decrease potential competition.
A.

57
Basic Economics of Potential Competition

Potential competition can be meaningful only in a market in which
actual competition has been suppressed by some means. If competitive
forces are working properly, no number of actual or potential entrants
will increase output or decrease prices. The ability to affect prices is
usually present only when there is some degree of market concentration. The more concentrated the market, the more likely it is that an
attempt to maintain prices will be successful.5 s With fewer significant
firms it is less costly to initiate and police a mechanism for curtailing
output, whether overt (specific agreement) or implicit (price leadership). Similarly, the more concentrated the market, the less likely it
is that a small nonparticipating firm can expeditiously expand its production and dissipate the benefits of the cartel.
When concentration in an industry is great enough for participating
firms to restrict supply, the market is referred to as an "oligopoly."
Although there is a good deal of disagreement as to the conditions
56 Cf. Campbell 8: Shepherd, supra note 18 (rule to prevent the "entrenchment" of
large firms).
57 This discussion draws heavily on the work of those who have advocated extensive
use of the doctrine. See, e.g., J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMParITrON (1956); Turner,
supra note 9. Like their work, this discussion assumes that the circumstances described
do occur in the real world. But see G. STIGLER, TBE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 19-22 (1968).
58 See J. BAIN, supra note 57, at 182; BUSINESS CONCEaTRAON AND PRICE POLICY (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955); studies collected in Brozen, The Antitrust
Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 13 J.L. & ECON. 279, 280 n.5 (1970).
But see

J.

McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDusTRLAL CONCENTRATION (1971); Brozen, Bain's

Concentrationand Rates of Return Revisited, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 351 (1971); Gort & Hogarty,
New Evidence on Mergers, 13 J.L. & ECON. 167 (1970).
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required for oligopolistic poWer,5 9 it is safe to assume that it is present
when the four largest firms account for 70 percent of all sales.
Even when an oligopoly exists, the participants in the market will
not be able to raise their prices without attracting new entrants unless
entry is somehow impeded. Two types of impediments may arise: true
barriers to entry, and the time lag required-to implement a decision
to enter the market. A.true barrier to entry is a cost not incurred by
firms already in the market, that a new firm must bear in order to
enter that market. It may require time to. enter even in the absence of
true barriers to entry, but the lag between, decision and actual entry
probably increases with the significance of whatever true barriers there
may be.-,,
Barriers to entry have always been recognized as the essential force
keeping potential competitors from entering the market.6 0 A true
barrier to entry exists only when long-term costs to prospective entrants
are higher than the costs of those firms already in the market.6 1 Although some economists have questioned the existence of any meaningfui barriers to entry in most markets,6 2 their existence is critical to the
potential competition doctrine. Without them, any price oligopolists
9 -The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, I TR n REG. REP.
4510, at 6884,
indicate that a market is "highly. concentrated" when the four largest firms account for
75 peicent of market sales, but merger activity is restrained in less concentrated markets
as well.Cf. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 54, at-72 ("structural oligopoly" is an
industry in which eight or fewer .firms supply 50 percent of the market; three other
levels of cqoncentration are defined); J. BAIN, INDusMRAL ORGANIZATION 131 (2d ed. 1968)
(fdlir-firi
ocncentraiion ratio of 50 percent ;.epresen ts high-moderate concentration);
STIGER -TAsK Foaci,'supra note 9 (fewer than five to ten effective rivals will stifle competition).
60 See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386' U.S. 568 (1967); J. BAuN, supra note 59, at
280-84; cf. Berger & Peterson, supra note- 18, at 493.
Pf Bain classifies the'various barriers into absolute cost advantages, such as ownership
of a, resource necessary for production, 'roduct differentiation advantages, and economies
of scale These barriers include both true cost differentials and the general "hindrances"
to entry, which new entrants can meet at the same cost as did the current participants.
J. BaN, sup-ra note 57, at 12. Scitovsky lists product differentiation, in the form of imperfections in the market for information, economies of scale, and differential access to capital as barriers to entry. T. Scrrovsay, WLFARE AND CoarmoN 331-37 (1951). Stigler
would call barriers to entry only those conditions, such as differences in entrepreneurial
ability; that confer a long-run cost advantage on established firms because other hindrances, such as product differentiation" and: economies of scale, increase the capital cost
of' entry'but provide no other advantage to them. G. STIGLER, supra note 57, at 69-70.
-62- The STIGLER TAsm FoRcE, supra note 9, recommended that no action be taken against
conglomerate, acquisitions because there is 'insufficient evidence that would-be entrants
into many markets face such barriers. Bain notes that "'absolute-cost' advantages of established flrms, asidepossibly from. those connected with large capital requirements, do not
appear (from the ifidustries sampled) to be a frequent source of barriers to entry." J.
BAIN, supra note 57, at 282..
.
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may set above the free market price will attract entry and restore more
competitive behavior.
The existence of barriers to entry does not by itself establish the case
for potential competition. In addition, some potential competitors must
be faced with lower barriers or time lags than others, and there will be
a meaningful loss of restraint on the oligopoly only if the firms with
lower barriers cease to be potential competitors. If there are many
potential competitors, all impeded to the same degree, the removal of
one of them cannot be important, since the continued presence of
the remaining firms will discipline the market to the same extent. The
removed firm must have had, then, some unique qualities for its potential competition to have been effective.6 3
Finally, the potential competition itself must be meaningful. Even if
the participants in the market have the ability to affect prices, there
are barriers to entry, and some firms possess a unique ability to enter,
the potential competition will not influence prices if the current participants can maximize the present value of their profits by charging a
monopoly price rather than a lower price designed to forestall entry.
This may occur in two circumstances. First, the monopoly price may
be less than the price needed to attract new entry. Barriers to entry
may be so high that no one will enter even with the prospect of reaping
monopoly profits. 64 Second, it may be rational for the market participants to raise prices above the forestalling price even though to do so
will attract entry.65 The present value of the short-run monopoly
profits, added to the competitive return after new entry, may exceed
the present value of the returns from charging the forestalling price
for an indefinite period. The more time that must elapse between a
potential competitor's decision to enter and its actual entry, the more
likely it is that this strategy will be adopted. If it is adopted, only the
potential competition of the potential entrant that faces the shortest
time lag is meaningful; as the first new entrant, it will restrict the time
for which the monopoly price may be charged.
If all of the conditions set forth above are satisfied, and the existence
63 It would be irrelevant that the entrant did not possess any unique advantages over

the other potential competitors only if entry by the new firm itself increased the barriers
faced by a second firm. This is quite unlikely ever to occur. But see FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 286 U.S. 568 (1967).
64 As economies of scale increase, the forestalling price is more likely to approach or
exceed the limit price. The new entrant, in order to capture a share of the market large
enough to enable it to operate at an efficient-size, will have to sell at a price lower than
that necessary to attract some smaller share. It will, therefore, require a larger "cushion"
between the maintained price and the competitive price before it will risk entry.
65 See Stigler, The Dominant Firm and the Inverted Umbrella, 8 J.L. & ECON. 167
(1965).
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of a potential competitor succeeds in enforcing a price lower than that
which would otherwise be charged, elimination of that competitor may
have an anticompetitive effect. It will have an anticompetitive effect
if the firm is either about to enter the market (an imminent entrant)
or has been recognized as a potential entrant that will enter if the price
is raised above the forestalling price (a bystander). The recognition
factor is important in bystander situations since the participants in the
market cannot conform their behavior to an unrecognized threat of
entry. Although many oligopolists are aware that at some price someone
will enter, such a general realization seems more likely when there is
a large group of potential entrants confronted with similar barriers to
entry than it is where one entrant (or a small group of entrants) is
uniquely qualified to enter. If a unique firm is not recognized as more
likely than the others to enter, the price will be raised above the level
at which the firm will enter and its entry will not be forestalled. In
most cases involving an undifferentiated group of potential entrants,
however, none will have unique attributes facilitating entry.
It should be noted that the doctrine of potential competition assumes
that the entry of a new firm will return the price to a competitive
level.6 6 This assumption is usually unfounded. When a few firms jointly
control a significant share of the market, they are able to agree among
themselves to curtail supply and to increase prices. The addition of
another significant competitor will make the creation of such an agreement more difficult-there will be more interests to compromise-and
will make the agreement more costly to police. Consequently, the more
participants there are in the market, the less likely it is that quantity
can be curtailed. But it makes little sense to assert that the injection
of a new competitor will restore the market to a fully competitive
price. If three competitors have conspired to affect the market, the
addition of a fourth cannot alone prevent a new, four-firm conspiracy
from arising. Indeed, antitrust policy is predicated upon the notion
that there can be anticompetitive conduct in any market, without regard to the number of participants.
The discussion thus far has focused on the ability of oligopolists to
charge a price persistently higher than market but lower than that at
which new firms will enter the market. Oligopolists may also be able
temporarily to charge a price in excess of the forestalling price. A
68 If the current participants knew that a new entrant would agree to continue restricting supply, they would have little incentive to forgo current monopoly profits in order
to deter such entry. Regardless of the speculations of the current participants, however,
there would be no economic benefit from a new entry after which quantity is still cur
tailed, and there is, therefore, no reason to promote such entry.
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potential competitor will enter, of course, only if it expects to operate
profitably at its postentry price. Due to the cost of overcoming barriers
to entry, however, the minimum price from which it can profit exceeds
the minimum price at which current participants can profit. Current
participants can, therefore, temporarily set a price above the forestalling
price without attracting entry; as long as the potential entrant recognizes the temporary nature of the price, it cannot be sure that its postentry price will be sufficiently high to justify its entry. The longer the
administered price remains above the forestalling price, the more
likely the potential entrant is to believe that the price will not be
reduced again after its entry, and thus the more likely it will be to
enter. This tactic relies, however, upon a threat to do something
resembling "predatory price-cutting," a threat that cannot profitably
67
be carried out.
Once these factors are considered, it is evident that removal of a
potential competitor meaningfully affects the market only if it increases
the forestalling price, and that this will happen infrequently. The price
actually charged must be an effective long-term forestalling pricethat is, something lower than a monopoly price. And for its removal
to increase the forestalling price, the potential competitor that is
eliminated must have had unique attributes. It is doubtful whether
economic and legal tools are sufficiently precise to identify those few
potential entrants whose disappearance has some effect, so that other
mergers may be allowed to proceed unimpeded. On balance, the high
cost of obtaining enough information to distinguish the harmful from
the innocuous removal of a potential competitor may justify a general
rule against conglomerate acquisitions, especially since there is little
reason to believe that they result in true economic efficiencies. 68 On
the other hand, some commentators have argued persuasively that so
few real decreases in potential competition are likely to result from
conglomerate mergers that the entire theory of potential competition
should be discarded in determining their legality.69 In any event, the
toehold theory makes little, if any, advance toward a rational rule of
67 See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958); Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON.

129 (1972).
68 See, e.g., Asch, Antitrust and Efficiency: Product Extension Mergers: A Comment, 37
SoUTERN EcoN. J. 100 (1970); Felton, Conglomerate Mergers, Concentration and Competition, 80 Ams. J. EcoN. SocIaL. 225 (1971); Prosper & Smith, Conglomerate Mergers and
Public Policy, 5 J. ECON. IssUEs 117 (1971); Staff of the 'FTC,Conglomerate Merger Per.
formance: An Empirical Analysis of Nine Corporations, 5 TRADE
EG. REP.
50,158
(1973).
69 See, e.g., G. STIGLER, supra note 57, at 21; STIGLER TASK FORCE, supra note 9.
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'broad applicability, as the economic consequences of its application
reveal.
B. Economic, Consequences of the Toehold Theory
One of the major functions of the theory, as the -Neal Task Force
suggested,70 will be to channel merger activity toward .the acquisition
-of small-firms already in the market. It will have. a procompetitive
effect, therefore, whenever the acquisition and subsequent expansion
of a firm.is th6 functional equivalent of internal entry and such internal
entry wotild itself hive, been: procompetitive. 71
As the previous itiscussion~showed, an entry into. the market is anticompetitive, becauseit diminishes potential icompetition, whenever
the forestalling .price is xaised as a result of the entry. An entry by toehold acquisition may, however, achieve exactly this result. Assume
that there are three firms stahding -on the edge of the market and that
abilities unique to firm .A enable it to enter either by expansion or
.by toehold acquisition whenever the price exceeds' X, while firms B
-and'C cannot enter until the price exceeds X + N. If the other condi'tions required, for operition of the potential competition doctrine objain, firm A effectively prevents the price from rising above X. If it
enters the .market iii such a. viay that the oligopoly 'is preserved, 72 the
'price can be increased to X-+ N without risk of further entry. A's entry,
therefore; would be anticompetitive. The best solution is for A not to
'enter the market at all,'ai least in the short run.78 The toehold theory,
'See note 12 suPra.
7i Anticompetitive interpal expansion is' rare; 'but although both. 'procompetitive and
anticompetitiye' internal growth lie without the scope of ,the Clayton Act, it makes little
sense to allow .anticompetitive internalgrowth when it does take place in a manner sub'jdctto the' Clayton Act.
72 See 'text at- note 64 supra,
70

78 See, e.g.,-,United States v: Ford, Motor Co., 405 U.S. 562,(1972), in which the decree
effectively prohibited Ford.fron entering the spark plug market for ten years. Yet the result is 'not antithetical to the potential competition theory p the case, as it might at first
appear to be. The spark plug market is shaped by the nature of the automobile market;
mechanics tend to use _;epja.cexent__spark plpgs of the same brand as the orininal eciuipment. Spark plug manufacturers cannot exist profitably, therefore, without a share of
the original equipment market. Under these -circunstances, the de novo entry of Ford
into the" market Would probably have destroyed Autolite,'and the -market would have
been in a position identical to that in which Ford owned Autolite. Although the Clayton
'Activould have :conferred" no jurisdiction over Ford's de -novo entry, Ford acquiired Auto'lite'and the Cout took the 9pportunity to lessen 'the rigidity of the 'market. By forcing
Ford to remain a bystander for ten years, it gave Auiolite the opportunity. to establish
'itself as an independent 'power. After expiration of the waiting period, Ford can act as
'a -bystander,, restraining prices, or 'enter internally and introduce new competition. Apparently. it is only Ford's enforced status as bystander, at least in the short run, that can
restore competition tothe spark plug market.
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however, favors 4's anticompetitive entry, which, if accomplished by
acquisition, could have been forbidden.
If A could have entered the market by toehold acquisition without
raising the forestalling price, then the requisites for application of the
potential competition doctrine would not be satisfied, probably because all three firms would have faced the same (or no) barriers to
entry. For the same reason, however, A could have entered by acquisition of a dominant firm without affecting the forestalling (prevailing)
price and without decreasing actual or potential competition. Consequently, the toehold theory may be inferior, in some bystander situations, to a policy of forcing the firm to remain a bystander, exercising
its effect on prices from that position. The entry of a uniquely qualified
potential competitor through a toehold acquisition may, therefore,
raise the forestalling price and should not be allowed; the entry, by
any method, of a firm that is not uniquely qualified is irrelevant to
competition and should never be forbidden. As a result, the usefulness
of the toehold theory is extremely limited.
The theory may be most justifiable when it is used to attack the
removal of one of only a few firms that had been bystanders or imminent internal entrants. If, in the example above, all three firms were
willing to enter at price X, the elimination of one of them would affect
the probability of future entry at X and thus increase the willingness
and ability of firms in the market to raise their price above X. 4
If ability to enter by a toehold acquisition becomes the standard for
determining the legality of entering by acquiring a dominant firm, it
should be considerably more difficult to find a decrease in potential
competition than if the standard is ability and willingness to enter
de novo. Entry by acquisition can be accomplished by means of purely
financial transactions such as a simple exchange of common stock. This
ease of entry significantly increases the number of firms plausibly
deemed potential entrants, since there is always a large number of
companies "in the market" for firms in totally unrelated fields. If one
such firm were removed as a potential entrant, the likelihood of one
of the remaining firms entering would probably not be seriously
diminished.7 5 Furthermore, the ease of entry by acquisition would
74 "Willingness to enter" means no more than the existence of a probability that a
firm will enter under given conditions. If that probability is, for example, one-half for
each firm, then of three bystander firms, at least one will enter in seven of eight cases in
which the price exceeds X, but two firms will produce at least one entry in only six of
eight cases.
75 The elimination of one potential entrant may even increase the chances of a second
potential entrant actually entering if it would be profitable for one firm to enter de novo
at a given time, but not for two to do so. The probability of either firm entering, when
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refute any claim that the actual entrant possessed "unique" qualifications. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the removal of
one potential entrant will affect the price at which further entry is
forestalled; all other firms with equal access to capital may enter at a
price identical to that at which the acquiring firm entered.
In sum, the toehold theory may induce anticompetitive acquisitions
without offering any compensatory benefit. If the standard of illegality
becomes ability to enter by toehold acquisitions rather than by internal
expansion, many acquisitions of "dominant" firms will be prohibited
even though there is no reason to believe that they would reduce
potential competition.
It is also evident that the bystander variant of the unadorned doctrine of potential competition can conserve as much time and effort as
the toehold theory, without importing the economically irrational consequences of the theory into the law. The toehold theory was developed
to avoid the almost impossible burden of proving that an alleged potential entrant was willing to enter de novo if it could not enter by merger.
But that showing was required only because the FTC and the courts
overlooked the effect of the bystander in the potential competition doctrine. A firm that is on the edge of an oligopolistic market affects prices
in that market regardless of whether it is currently willing to enter.
The relevant factor is its willingness to enter at some future, higher
price. The economic case is established if the removal of the firm as a
bystander would increase the forestalling price-that is, if the firm has
unique qualities that make it the bystander with the least barrier to
entry. That fact can be shown wholly through objective proof.70
Finally, there are few, if any, acquisitions that can be prohibited
under the toehold theory but not under the bystander formulation of
the potential competition doctrine.77 The bystander theory is analytically much more direct, and because it asks the right questions, does
not involve the possibility of sanctioning anticompetitive acquisitions.
By requiring the government to ascertain precisely whether a uniquely
each is guarding against the possible actions of the other may, therefore, be less than
the chance of a single firm entering when the possibility of a competing simultaneous
entry has been eliminated or reduced.
76 It may be more difficult to show objectively that a firm was a "recognized" entrant,
since the "recognizing" firms already in the market have an interest in the outcome of
the litigation.
74,157
77 The result in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 1972 Trade Cas.
(10th Cir. 1972), for example, was reached not because Kennecott had been a potential
de novo entrant, or even because it had failed to make a toehold merger, but simply because "[t]he removal of Kennecott from the edge of the market and the substitution of
it within the market for Peabody, the leading producer and distributor, eliminated a
substantial competitive force." Id. at 79.
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situated firm has been removed from the edge of the market, the bystander formulation also reduces the danger of overpredicting anticompetitive effects.
III.

UNDEFINED AREAS REMAINING IN THE TOEHOLD THEORY

The toehold theory decries the acquisition of dominant firms in concentrated markets, but the FTC has never specified what it means
by a "dominant firm" or a "concentrated market." While these ambiguities underlie the potential competition doctrine as a whole, the
toehold theory raises additional questions of its own. How small must
an acquired company be to qualify as a toehold? To what extent is
the government relieved of its burden of proof? Does the theory apply
to all cases of potential competition, or is it confined by its logic to
conglomerate acquisitions? All of these questions must be answered
before the expected benefits of certainty and channeling can be realized.
A.

Allocation of the Burden of Proof

Since the FTC developed the toehold theory because it was unable
to prove that an acquiring firm was a potential competitor, it is not
surprising to find that the theory has been used to reduce the standard
of proof required of the government. No court has yet attempted to
specify the extent to which the need for proof may have been diminished, but the FTC seems to hold that there is no longer a need for
any proof. In each of its decisions, it has said that acquisition of
a dominant firm alone establishes the ability and willingness of the
78
If
acquiring firm to enter by means of some smaller acquisition.
this deduction is the end of its inquiry, then the FTC has erected a
per se rule against conglomerate acquisitions of firms despite the stat79
utory requirement that each case be proven individually.
The FTC has tried to shift the burden of persuasion to the acquiring
firm. Indeed, in Bendix, the Sixth Circuit seemed to assume that the
toehold theory required Bendix to refute the inference that it would
have made a toehold acquisition if it could not have acquired a large
firm.80 The Second Circuit, however, in affirming The Stanley Works,
78 See note 30 supra.
79 Each case must be proved by substantial evidence. Federal Trade Commission Act
of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). Per se rules may be promulgated only after there is general agreement that all incidents of a class of behavior should be unlawful under the
Act; this is not the case when there are conglomerate acquisitions. See generally Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YAME
L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price FixingSans Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 837 (1952).
80 Bendix Corp. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 534, 1971 Trade Cas.
73,724 (6th Cir. 1971). The
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made several disparaging remarks about the FTC's method of "proof"
and intimated that, had the decision turned on the toehold theory, it
would have reversed the agency for improperly shifting the burden of
8
proof. '
The FTC's strategy has, in fact, been to create a presumption. By
law, the FTC has the burden of going forward in its proceedings. It
claims to discharge that burden, however, by proving that the merger
was made and that the market conditions for triggering the potential
competition doctrine existed. The presumption then arises that the
acquiring firm would have entered by a toehold acquisition. In effect,
the FTC has ruled that a prima facie case can be made from logical
inferences drawn from the fact of the large acquisition.32 Such a procedure would probably pass muster under the Clayton Act. 3
The burden of proof should be allocated in accordance with the purposes of the theory, that is, to prevent only those mergers that reduce
potential competition. The entire proceeding should be designed,
therefore, to identify mergers that increase the forestalling price; placing the burden of proof on the respondent is ill-adapted to that end.
The discussion above of the economics of the toehold doctrine indicated that the theory produces meaningful results in only a small
proportion of all cases. Although a somewhat larger proportion can be
expected among litigated cases, many challenged acquisitions will not,
in fact, be anticompetitive. If the respondent can refute a charge only
by proving that smaller firms were unavailable, the FTC will be able
to neglect inquiring into all of the important factors that determine
case was remanded to the Commission because the toehold theory was introduced first in
the final decision, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; the violation could
not have prejudiced Bendix if there were no defenses to the theory.
81 See note 52 supra. The court in Kennecott ignored the problem of proof altogether
when it affirmed the decision.
82 The FTC has at times seemed uneasy with this allocation of burdens. In The Stanley
Works, for example, it tried to demonstrate that the company had investigated at least
two other cabinet hardware manufacturers and had chosen one of them as an alternate
merger target. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,646, at 21,701 (FTC 1971). In Kennecott, proof
was adduced that other firms in Kennecott's position were hurriedly acquiring coal producers and reserves, and that Kennecott itself had already made one toehold acquisition.
3 TRADE REc. REP.
19,619, at 21,668 (FTC 1971). In Bendix, the FTC examined the
"whole logic of Bendix's corporate development" and concluded that entry, in some form,
into the replacement filter market was inevitable. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,288, at 21,444
(FTC 1970). Thus, in each of the toehold theory cases, the FTC offered a standard form
of "objective" proof that the firm was a potential entrant. The agency apparently remains
afraid to rely upon a mere recitation of the toehold theory.
83 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (horizontal merger
producing high concentration in market presumptively unlawful); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (significant foreclosure of market through vertical integration presumptively unlawful).
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the forestalling price; instead, attention will be focused on a factor that
is irrelevant to the economics of the situation. As a result of this shift
in the burden of proof, a broad class of mergers, few if any of which
may be anticompetitive, will have been proscribed.
In order to focus inquiry on the relevant factors, a rational allocation
of the burden of proof would require the government to prove each
of its allegations against the acquiring firm. Objective proof should be
required to demonstrate that (1) the firm was a potential entrant (2)
by an available toehold merger (8) whose entry by acquisition of a
dominant firm (4) increased the probability that above-market prices
could be charged. If proof of these four elements is required, however,
the major advantage of the toehold theory will have been dissipated.
With objective proof of this force, the government could establish
that the firm was a recognized bystander or an imminent entrant whose
entry decreased potential competition.
B.

Types of Acquisitions to Which the Theory Applies

The potential competition doctrine is used against all forms of
mergers-horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. The toehold theory
has been applied only to conglomerate acquisitions, 4 and an examination of its rationale leads to the conclusion that any other application
would be counterproductive.
The toehold acquisition is encouraged because it resembles conglomerate expansion by internal growth. Internal vertical and horizontal growth, however, produces exactly those effects that lead to
condemnation of vertical and horizontal acquisitions. Horizontal
mergers are forbidden when the increase in economic concentration
tends to dampen competitive forces in the market. Internal growth,
such as a large firm increasing its share of the market, may produce
exactly that effect, but it is not illegal."5 Similarly, vertical acquisitions
84 But see PepsiCo, Inc., Dkt. 8903, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
20,143, at 22,132 (FTC
complaint 1972) (an apparent toehold allegation in a case predominantly vertical and
horizontal). Both Kennecott and Stanley had minimal horizontal components. Thus,
before Kennecott acquired Peabody it had acquired a small coal firm, and when Stanley
acquired Amerock, Stanley had a small architectural hardware division. Curiously, the
theory has never been applied to a "pure" conglomerate acquisition, one in which the
acquiring and acquired firms have no prior relation whatever. Yet the toehold theory may
be the only way in which these acquisitions can be attacked, since firms that have no
relation to a market rarely expand internally into that market.
85 One possible justification for this difference in treatment is that the addition of
new capacity to an industry, regardless of whether it results from new entry or the
expansion of a current entrant, presumably occurs because the expanding firm is more
efficient than its competitors. Policymakers might, therefore, favor a market position
reached by expansion over one reached by acquisition.
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are discouraged by the FTC and the Antitrust Division because they
are said to "foreclose" part of the market to independent competitors.
It is assumed that a vertically integrated firm will sell to or buy from
itself and that outside firms will be foreclosed from a source of supply
or a market for their goods. To the extent that such foreclosure occurs
at all,86 it results equally from vertical integration accomplished
through internal growth and from the product of mergers. Consequently, it would be incongruous to encourage or allow vertical expansion through a toehold merger, while simultaneously attacking other
mergers leading to the same end.
C.

Definitions of a Toehold Acquisition

Few of the problems of proof will be resolved, and none of the
desired channelling will occur, unless it is clear to all concerned
which acquisitions are toeholds and which are not. At present, however, there are few guidelines on this question. The cases do no more
than identify particular acquisitions that were not toeholds, but since,
with one exception, s2 the firms held not to be toeholds were the leading firms in the market, the holdings are not very helpful. Dicta in
Beatrice Foods Co. described a desirable acquisition as one "too small
to be a significant competitive factor. 8 8 Bendix referred to the toehold
as a "small company capable of expansion into a substantial competitive force." 8 9 This latter definition must include some firms that
are not "too small to be... significant," since a truly insignificant firm
would lack the special knowledge and market experience necessary to
make it a candidate for substantial expansion. 90
These insubstantial hints at the nature of an acceptable toehold candidate were given some substance in The Stanley Works, but the substance was at considerable variance with the theory. Having described
a toehold as a "small non-dominant company," 91 the FTG went on to
find that two companies whose acquisition had been considered would
have been acceptable toehold acquisitions. 92 They were the third and
86 No foreclosure occurs unless it is more efficient for a firm to make allocation
decisions by fiat than to leave them to the market. Allen, Vertical Integration and Market
Foreclosure: The Case of Cement and Concrete, 14 J.L. & ECON. 251 (1971).
87 United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 401
U.S. 986 (1971).
88 (19 65-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,244, at 22,332 (FTC 1965).
89 The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,288, at 21,445 (FTC 1970).
90 Kennecott referred several times to "smaller firms" without elaboration. Kennecott
Copper Corp., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. R '.
19,619, at 21,669 (FTC 1971).
91 3 TRADE REG. R P.
19,646, at 21,701 (FTC 1971).
92 Id.
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fifth largest firms in the industry, with, respectively, 8.5 percent and
3.8 percent of all sales. In an industry so concentrated that the five
largest firms account for 57.5 percent of industry sales, these firms were
not insignificant factors.
If these firms are available as toeholds, it is difficult to know where
the line will be drawn in any particular market. Any "nondominant"
firm may be a toehold if dominance is defined in terms of size relative
to the largest firm in the market and not in terms of ordinal position
or market share. For example, the second largest firm in a very concentrated market might be available as a toehold when the largest firm
has 60 percent of the sales. 93 The expansion of such a firm might significantly enhance market performance. 94
Certainty requires that quantitative rules for defining a toehold be
promulgated. 95 The rules could conveniently be linked to a quantitative definition of a "concentrated market" by making any firm not
among those on which a specified concentration ratio is based available
as a toehold. For example, if a market is considered concentrated because the four largest firms account for 60 percent of sales, the fifth
largest firm would be an acceptable toehold; if concentration is predicated upon an eight-firm concentration ratio, the ninth largest firm
would be a toehold. 96
93 But cf. St. Joe Minerals, Dkt. 8892, 3 TRADE REG. RE'.
20,047 (FTC 1972)
(complaint), in which the FTC alleged that section 7 was violated when St. Joe, a major
producer of lead, acquired (and substantially enlarged) Quemetco, a leading producer
of lead oxide and antimonial lead. Although Quemetco had about 7 percent of the
market, the largest firm in the market had about 60 percent. The structure of the
industry made sales by St. Joe to Quemetco quite unlikely, Respondent's Reply to
Proposed Complaint at 16, so the acquisition is properly classified as a product-extension
conglomerate merger.
94 Any acquisition of a nondominant firm that improved market performance would
be acceptable if toeholds were defined in terms of market structure. This would not be
justifiable under the Clayton Act, however, since wholly procompetitive acquisitions
are never illegal under the Act. Acquisitions whose effect is procompetitive in one
market but anticompetitive in another, though, are judged on the anticompetitive
effect alone. "If anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive
consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the
end as large as the industry leader." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 370 (1963). Procompetitive consequences may be considered "where two small firms
in a market propose to merge in order to be able to compete more successfully with the
leading firms in that market." Id. at 370-71.
95 NErA
TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 13892; cf. Turner, supra note 9, at 1318-19,
1386. But cf. discussion of STIGLER TAsK FORCE note 62 supra.
96 It has proved exceedingly difficult to formulate standards for assessing the effect of
concentration and the minimum market share at which an individual firm acquires
market power. Compare C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 54, at 72 with J. BAMN, supra
note 59, at 14-41 and NEAL TASK FORCE, supra note 12 and Stigler, Mergers and Pre-
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This basic rule could be complemented by two de minimis rules
to deal with situations in which there are a few large firms and the
next largest firm is quite small. First, any firm with a market share of
less than 5 percent could be presumptively acceptable as a toehold
even if it is among the firms on which the concentration ratio is based.
Second, a firm would be an acceptable toehold when it has a market
share of less than 15 percent and the next largest firm has at least twice
its share of the market.9 7 These rules would be arbitrary, but they are
not unreasonable since they would rarely allow a merger with significant anticompetitive effects or prevent a merger with significant
economies.9 8 The benefits of certainty, made possible by the toehold
theory, cannot be realized on a case-by-case basis.
IV.

THE TOEHOLD THEORY UNDER SECTION

7

The purpose of the toehold theory is basically to require an acquiring firm, if it wishes to enter a market, to do so by a route that "would
be more pro-competitive than the path it has chosen."'9 9 The FTC has
relied upon the legislative history of the Clayton Act to demonstrate
that Congress considered small acquisitions procompetitive. In Bendix,
the first toehold case, it said:
Such procompetitive mergers are not only not forbidden by Secdon 7, they are positively encouraged. . . .A potential entrant
may enter not only by internal expansion; he may enter the market
by acquiring a failing company, or a small company in difficulty,
or by making a toehold acquisition of a small member of the
industry. These methods of entry, no less than internal expansion,
and in some cases perhaps more than entry by internal expansion,
may inject a new competitive element of vigor and strength into
an otherwise stagnant market. 00
It quoted the above passage in its Kennecott decision and concluded
ventative Antitrust, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176, 182 (1955) and Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, supra note 59, at 6,884 (1968). The difficulty becomes more acute when the
FTC combines the potential competition doctrine with the incipiency doctrine of Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962), to halt acquisitions in an "incipient
oligopoly." There can be neither objective standards nor certainty in that case, and it is
doubtful that a convincing argument can be made that entry in any form into such a
market can be anticompetitive in the sense that the forestalling price is affected. See
19,619, at 21,666-67 (FTC 1971).
Kennecott Copper Co., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE REG. REP.
97 One can imagine cases in which this rule would not work--such as a four-firm
market in which the firms held shares of 40 percent, 30 percent, 15 percent, and 15
percent-but they are rare if they exist at all.
98 Cf. Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 18, at 1379.
99 United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563 (N.D. Ii. 1968).
19,288, at 21,446 (FTC 1970).
100 The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
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that "[t]he antitrust goal established at a high level of government is
to discourage substantial acquisitions and to channel merger activities
into directions that would increase competition."' 0 1There is no doubt that Congress did not intend to impede acquisitions that had no anticompetitive effect. It is also safe to assume that
Congress would prefer a procompetitive acquisition to one that is
neutral with respect to competition. But Congress has not enacted
either of these sentiments, and it hardly follows that making a competitively neutral acquisition can constitute a violation of the Clayton
Act simply because a procompetitive acquisition could have been made.
The doctrine of potential competition has been criticized as too
speculative to form the basis for a violation of the Clayton Act. Commentators have portrayed it as an unjustified attempt to enforce the
status quo because not directed against a present diminution of competition. 10 2 The FTC and the courts have rightly rejected this criticism 10 3 since the elimination of potential competition makes possible
an immediate increase in the forestalling price; competition is lessened
when the acquisition takes place.
The potential competition doctrine compares two actual marketsyesterday's, in which the acquiring firm was a potential competitor,
and today's, in which its competition has been removed. The toehold
theory, in contrast, purports to compare the real market in which a
potential competitor has acquired a dominant firm and the hypothetical market that would have existed had it acquired a toehold. Instead
of pointing to an action that the firm has taken to decrease competition,
the government points to an action that it did not take that would have
increased competition. The Clayton Act, by its terms, reaches only
those actions that decrease competition, not those that fail to increase
competition.10 '
A construction of the Act to prohibit all actions that are not reasonably procompetitive' 0 5 must deal with the anomalies it produces: a
101 Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRAE REG. REP.
19,619, at 21,669 (FTC 1971).
102 See, e.g., Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 ABA
SEcrION or ANTIRusr LAw 128, 142-43 (1958).
108 The rejection is implicit in the outcome of United States v. Ford Motor Co., 405
U.S. 562 (1972), and all preceding cases relying on the potential competition doctrine.
See Turner, supra note 9, at 1379--80; 39 FoRaDHAm L. P v. 515, 520 (1971). But cf. Jones &
Heiden, supra note 53, at 256: Commissioner Jones advocates looking at "the question
of lost potential competition when it takes the form of a firm acquiring a leading market
position and thus being a candidate for making a foothold acquisition and expanding it
in a way that helps competition." (Emphasis added).
104 The NEAL TAsK FORcE, supra note 12, implicitly recognized this by proposing new
legislation to deal with the situation.
105 Turner would compare the degrees of competition that would result from
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firm may lawfully acquire a failing company; it may acquire a nondominant firm; and it may withdraw from the market altogether. Each
course may be considerably less procompetitive than some alternative,
but none is forbidden by the Act. There must be some "probability"
of anticompetitive consequences, however small, to come within the
statutory prohibition. 10 As a comparison of real and hypothetical
market states, however, the toehold theory cannot reveal a probability
that present competition will be lessened by the acquisition of a dominant firm. That would require isolating the effect of the acquisition,
the impossibility of which led to formulation of the theory in the first
place.
V.

USE OF THE TOEHOLD THEORY BY DEFENDANTS:
AN IRONIC OUTCOME

Although the toehold theory is unlikely to enable the government
to prohibit a significant group of mergers beyond those already reachable under the bystander formulation of the potential competition
doctrine, 0 7 it may prove very useful to defendants. As long as the
meaning of "toehold acquisition" remains unquantified, defendants
can argue that their particular merger is within the permissible limits
of a reasonable definition, and they may have a good deal of success.
The language and results of the FTC's own opinions suggest four ways
in which the toehold theory might be used defensively.
First, the maximum allowable market share for qualification as a
toehold may be challenged as unreasonably low. In Stanley, the FTC
characterized the third largest firm in the cabinet hardware market,
with 8.5 percent of sales, as a toehold candidate. 08 If 8.5 percent qualifies in a very concentrated industry, it would not be hard to argue that
12 percent or 15 percent firms are also toehold acquisitions, especially
in less concentrated markets.
Second, defendants may attempt to recast the doctrine as one prohibiting acquisition of firms based on their ordinal market position.
Viewed in this light, Stanley would legitimate acquisition of the third
allowance and disallowance of the merger and forbid the merger if to do so would be
more procompetitive. Turner, supra note 9, at 1380. This interpretation is even more
strained when the postallowance market and some hypothetical market are compared.
But see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963): "On the
contrary, if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight

increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration
is correspondingly great."
106 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294 (1962).
107 See text and notes at notes 70-77 supra.
108 The Stanley Works, Dkt. 8760, 3 TRADE RE. REP.
19,646, at 21,701 (FTC 1971).
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largest firm in a concentrated market. In addition, if the third firm were
considerably smaller than the second, the defendant might appeal to
the FTC's concern for "strengthened competition"'10 9 on the theory
that only a relatively strong firm can quickly be built to a size at which
economies make competition with the very largest firms practical. 110
The third avenue available to defendants involves an extension of
the toehold rationale. In Bendix, the FTC referred to weak and failing
firms, in addition to toeholds, as favored candidates for acquisition."1
If toehold acquisitions are to be encouraged in order to make otherwise "weak" firms more competitive, a firm with a declining share of the
market should be more likely to qualify as a toehold. The firm would
presumably have been acquired in order to improve its ability to compete and, therefore, improve overall market performance. This is
not to suggest that a declining market share is by itself enough to
require that a firm be classified as a toehold; it is a factor, however,
to which any defendant to whom it is open would point in shaping the
toehold concept to fit a particular acquisition.
Finally, if the acquired firm is losing money, a variation on the "failing company" defense is possible. The failing company defense may be
tendered without regard to the size of the acquired company; if the
firm is truly failing,112 competition is not decreased by someone acquiring it since it would otherwise disappear altogether. Similarly, acquisition of a merely weak company by a firm capable of reinvigorating
it would be of greater benefit to the market than would the acquisition
of a prosperous firm of like size." If procompetitive effect is the touch109 Kennecott Copper Corp., Dkt. 8765, 3 TRADE R G. REP.
19,619, at 21,669 (FTC
1971): "Indeed, the antitrust goal established at a high level of government is to discourage substantial acquisitions and to channel merger activities into directions that
would increase competition."
110 This argument would be quite illogical. Any expansion of the output of the third
largest firm would, in the short run, decrease prices but increase the four-firm concentration ratio. At some future point, the more highly concentrated market that emerges
would be even more susceptible to collusive or other anticompetitive behavior.
111 The Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
19,288, at 21,446 (FTC 1970).
112 See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (rigorous criteria
laid down for the assertion of the failing company defense). In addition, the courts must
still find the injury to competition from the acquisition to be outweighed by other
considerations of the public interest. A firm that is losing money rapidly, thinly
capitalized, and probably fadng failure in the near future may not necessarily support a
failing company defense in the FTC's view. See United States Steel Corp., Dkt. 8655,
3 TRADE REG. REx,.
20,139 (FTC 1972); cf. The Papercraft Co., Dkt. 8779, 3 TRADE RaE.
RaP.
19,725, at 21,780 (FTC 1971).
113 Many attempts have been made to establish a less stringent (or "weak company")
defense, all without success. See, e.g., United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345
F. Supp. 117, 1972 Trade Cas.
74,080 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (acquired company had
suffered "devastating losses" and falling sales; collapse was imminent).
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stone for whether an acquisition is a toehold, the courts will face a
relativity they have previously rejected: at present a firm is either
"failing" or it is not, and if it is not, its weak financial status and
the acquiring firm's claims that competition will be increased are
irrelevant." 4
The orientation of the toehold theory toward the reinvigoration of
firms that cannot effectively compete requires, however, that the "weak"
status of the firm be taken into consideration, The weak company
defense will have been revived-this time to increase the market share
that may be held by a toehold acquisition.
CONCLUSION

As the bounds of permissible acquisition expand, whether along the
four lines suggested or others, the theory will lose whatever validity
it may once have had."15 Expansion will be difficult for the FTC to
thwart, not only because the possible bases for extension fit within
the rationale of the theory, but also because the definition of a toehold
is probably a question of law. 116 The FTC can support factual determinations, such as whether an acquisition decreases competition, on
substantial evidence,"l7 but no such shield protects its conclusions of
law. With the new-found opportunity to attack the Commission on a
question of law, defendants will have gained a substantial advantage
that they lack in most section I cases.

FrankH. Easterbrook
114 This is not true in all cases. The acquisition might materially increase the market
share of a dominant firm, or increase the four-firm concentration ratio, if it is horizontal.
And, in almost every case in which the dodtrine is applied, the outcome would have
been more procompetitive had some noncompeting firm acquired the failing company.
The FTC has recognized this problem and will not approVe the acquisition of a failing
company by a tompeting firm until prospects of acquisition by a noncompeting firm
appear to be nil. United States Steel Corp., Dkt. 8655, 3 TRA E REG.
20,139 (FTC
1972); cf. United States v. Lever Brothers Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (result
dubious after Philadelphia National Bank); Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
§ 21, supra note 59, at 6889 (1968).
115 If the toehold theory is ever applied to a horizontal or vertical acquisition, successful invocation of the theory by defendants would establish a new de minimis rule
with a far higher threshold than any tolerated at present.
116 See, e.g., The Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 1972 Trade Cas.
74,207 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).
117 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).

